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"Ethics and Aesthetics are One": The Case of Zen Aesthetics 
Abstract: The theoretical possibility of the aims and methods of moral education and of art 
education converging is explored through the examination of the Japanese Tea Ceremony which 
is grounded in the Buddhist metaphysics and psychology of nonduality.  This exploration is in 
response to the call for  "aestheticized ethics" in the contemporary Western moral theorizing 
which rejects the traditional rigid separation of the moral and the aesthetic. 
 
I. Introduction 
 As many may recognize, the title of this paper, "Ethics and aesthetics are 
one," comes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1961, p. 147).  Shusterman (1990) 
explains that what Wittgenstein means by this statement is that there exists a 
fundamental unity between ethics and aesthetics, and he goes on to explicate the 
many aspects, according to Wittgenstein, in which ethics and aesthetics intersect 
each other.  Since that enigmatic statement was made by Wittgenstein over thirty 
years ago, the moral theorizing in the West has been  seeing an increasing 
interest in the "aestheticization of ethics," that is,  
the conception of living ethically in terms of living aesthetically.  My own 
interest in this Western trend in the aestheticization of ethics stems from the 
recognition of a parallel case in Eastern thought, namely, Buddhist aesthetics (for 
example, Zen aesthetics) which is fundamentally grounded in the unity of ethics 
and aesthetics.  In this paper, I shall first briefly examine the unity thesis of ethics 
and aesthetics as it came to be appreciated in the contemporary moral theorizing 
in the West.  I shall then explore the unity thesis through the example of Zen 
aesthetics.  To my understanding, Zen aesthetics is a perfect example of the 
fundamental unity of art and morality achieved through a kind of 
"transcendental" viewpoint which has to do with overcoming the egoic, dualistic 
frame of consciousness.  More about this by and by.   
 I undertake the exploration of the unity thesis with two educational 
implications in mind.  First, if ethics and aesthetics can be conceived to be 
fundamentally linked, then one implication that this understanding has is that 
moral education and art education could be a vehicle for enhancing each other.  
By this, I do not mean that all art education can and should be reduced to moral 
education or vice versa.  Rather, my suggestion is that there may be a certain 
kind of understanding for morality and art under which the education in these 
domains may fruitfully share a common space of endeavor.  Secondly, with 
respect to the Zen aesthetics example, the reason why I bring in the Zen 
aesthetics as a case study is my awareness that a cross-cultural perspective is 
increasingly demanded of us as educators by our commitment to multicultural 
education.  Because the metaphysical or ontological orientation towards life and 
world that underlies Zen aesthetics is different from the one that we are familiar 
with in the Western tradition, my bringing together of the postmodern trend in 
the aestheticization of the ethics with Zen aesthetics may serve to facilitate the 
kind of fruitful "fusion of horizons" that Taylor (1994), borrowing Gadamer's 
celebrated phrase, speaks of in "The Politics of Recognition" as an ideal for 
multicultural education. 
 
II. Aestheticization of the Ethical: a Postmodern Search for an Ethic of Life 
 What has aesthetics to do with ethics?  We often think of the artist and the 
moralist as being two different breeds of people and, even, likely to be 
antithetical in their search for summum bonum.  While I concede that this 
perception harbors stereotyping, nonetheless I believe that it reveals the vein of a 
particular conception of morality that is part of our commonsensical view, 
namely that morality has to do with following rules of conduct that are 
formulated in view of "human nature" and human purpose.  In contrast, our 
commonsensical understanding also has it that in doing art and being creative, 
the artist has to challenge the norms and break rules.  But what if there is no 
fixed human nature and human purpose?  What if the notion of what we are like 
and what we aspire to is an open-ended question always waiting to be 
reconceived and reformulated, therefore requiring all the creativity of an artist?  
Ethics and aesthetics then may not be two distinct and separate spheres of 
concern but can inform and complement each other.  Let us pursue this 
possibility. 
 The belief in human nature and human purpose is what is usually 
referred to as essentialism in moral philosophy, and it has been a basic 
metaphysical assumption in the Western tradition since ancient times.  
According to this view, human nature or essence (ergon) is what defines us as 
truly human, and therefore knowing it helps us to be clear about the end (telos) 
towards which we should strive to live.  This essentialistic understanding, which 
actually is still very much alive in our midst, is rooted in the ancient and 
medieval Western metaphysics of there being one transcendental noumenal 
reality which lies outside the contingency of existence.  As long as we believed in 
this noumenal reality and its realization in humans as essence and telos, morality 
will be a matter of figuring these out and devising ways to fulfill them.  As 
Putnam (1987, p. 48) puts it, if "we know what the human essence is, what the 
human ergon is, what the inclusive human end is, and we are capable of 
knowing all this using reason, then the problem of using rationality and freewill, 
first to discover what one should do and then to do it, is, in certain ways 
analogous to an engineering problem."  Ethics as an "applied science" of 
determining right things to do and right ways to live is essentially connected 
with this foundationalistic metaphysics of there being a fixed and objective 
reality of human nature and human ends.     
 However, we have good reasons to argue that reality is always already 
interpreted by the human mind which itself is contingently disposed by the 
whole evolutionary stream of history and culture.  It is safe to say that at least 
intellectually we have been increasingly abandoning the foundationalistic 
metaphysics of the human ergon and telos.  In this so-called postmodern era, 
people are increasingly suspicious of any talk of ahistorical, inherent, fixed 
properties to the world and humans which define us as who we are and which 
point us to where we should go.  (To be expected, there are thinkers--for 
example, MacIntyre (1984)--who feel that we ought to resurrect some form of 
essentialistic, foundationalistic worldview in order to restore our faith in 
morality.)  Speaking of Freud as one of the foremost modern progenitors of the 
aestheticization of ethics, Rorty (1986, p. 15) states that "[Freud] broke some of 
the last chains that bind us to the Greek idea that we or the world, have a nature 
that, once discovered, will tell us what we should do with ourselves." 
 So, what remains in the way of ethical theorizing and conduct when we 
have abandoned the transcendentally anchoring notions of essence and telos?  
Precisely, the problem with this situation is that nothing seems to remain, 
creating "ethical horror vacui," to use Shusterman's dramatic description.  So 
central was the essentialistic worldview to our traditional conceptions of ethics 
that once it collapses, the result is a moral vacuum which, some would argue, is 
surely indicated by such signs as the lack of societal agreement on moral values, 
standards, criteria, and means.  It is into this vacuum that, according to 
Shusterman, "the ethics of taste naturally rushes in" (Shusterman, 1987: p. 118).  
But, what is this ethics of taste?  This is how Shusterman characterizes it, and I 
will quote him at some length (ibid., p. 123): 
The result of this demotion of the moral to merely one significant factor in ethical 
deliberation on how to live the good life is to make such deliberation much more like 
aesthetic judgment and justification than syllogistic or legalistic discourse.  Finding what is 
right becomes an affair of finding the most fitting and appealing gestalt, of perceiving the 
most attractive and harmonious constellation of various and variously weighted, changing 
and changingly weighted, features in a given situation or life. . . Similarly, ethical justification 
must come to resemble the aesthetic in appealing to perceptually persuasive argument in its 
attempt to convince, an attempt that relies on and aims to sustain and extend some basic 
consensus, and yet also recognizes and serves to promote a tolerance of difference of 
perception or taste emerging from it.  Ethical judgments can no more be demonstratively 
proven categorically true through unexceptionable principles than can aesthetic ones.  Ethics 
and aesthetics become one in this meaningful and sensible sense; and the project of an ethical 
life becomes an exercise in living aesthetically. 
From the above account, we gather that the plurality of moral perceptions and 
moral arguments, which defies the traditional conception of morality as 
universalizable rules and principles, is the fundamental character of aestheticized 
ethics.  Both at the general, macro level of debating about visions and versions of 
moral life and moral conduct and at the particular, micro level of debating about 
the interpretation of a concrete moral situation, the aestheticized ethics results in 
an open-ended, dynamic, and decisively pluralistic approach to moral aims, 
means, and deliberation.   
 Now, one might raise the question here: "It is all very well to embrace 
pluralism and engage in dynamic and open-ended interpretations with respect to 
moral perception and debates about moral matters in general.  But since the 
possibility of assessing all these different visions, versions and perceptions 
against a system of fundamental rights and wrongs is ruled out, wouldn't the 
moral debate end up just as a debate, with no common ground upon which to 
build a public morality?  How can an ethic of taste be embraced as a viable public 
morality?  How can there be a public morality without norms which regulate and 
make coherent the interpersonal conducts?"   
 I would argue that the ethics of taste is not without norms or criteria that 
act as regulators or guides.  Shusterman's own account is suggestive of a few 
regulatory principles, such as tolerance of difference, ambiguity, and uncertainty; 
perception of emergent harmony; and cultivation of sensitivity or receptivity.  To 
me, these concepts and others figure in both the language of morals and of arts 
and serve to bridge the two fields with the result of enriching each other.  Of 
these concepts, receptivity and sensitivity are of particular interest to me because 
I am persuaded by the view that their cultivation and exercise would constitute 
the core of moral responsibility on the part of the moral agents (Nussbaum 1990; 
Vetlesen 1994).  For, being moral implies, at the most foundational level, 
understanding, not abstractly but concretely, in flesh and blood, as it were, each 
other's experiences concerning joy, fears, sufferings, and hopes, and thus 
empathy, or more accurately, empathic moral imagination, is a sine qua non moral 
activity that secures such understanding. 
 Empathy and its cognate virtues or moral abilities have received an 
increasing recognition as the key to becoming morally competent humans 
(Vetlesen 1994, Blum 1994).  Not only does the lack of moral empathy result in an 
impoverished understanding of others, but also, worse, it may even result in 
missing entirely the moral import of a situation.  Moral blindness and numbness 
set in (Vetlesen 1994), disabling us to function as moral agents, let alone sensitive 
and sagacious ones.   
 Above, inasmuch as I made this failure of moral empathy sound like the 
moral agent's failure to exercise his or her capacity, to my understanding, a truer 
picture is one in which the agent has at her disposal a limited or restricted 
capacity for empathy.  In other words, I am shifting in this case the framework of 
understanding from the person to the capacity, and my reason for this move is 
the belief that it is not the will but the capacity or resources which we have to 
focus on when trying to enhance the moral performance.  In other words, the 
foundational task of becoming moral is to cultivate and enlarge this capacity, and 
it is at this juncture that I wish to bring in the case of Zen aesthetics.  For, Zen 
aesthetics is the clearest example of where the cultivation of the capacity for 
empathy, not just with other humans but with all sentient beings, is pursued to 
the utmost extent of deconstructing the dualistic consciousness of the subject-
object dichotomy that is deemed to stand in the way of attaining the full capacity 
for empathy.  The result is uncovering or recovering the nondual consciousness 
that we are said to be capable of, which, according to the Buddhist epistemology 
and psychology, is essential to our becoming radically empathic, therefore, 
compassionate, harmony-seeking human beings.  The limited space in this paper 
does not allow me to explore properly the Buddhist epistemology and 
psychology and its fundamental insight into the nondual consciousness and its 
import to morality.  Thus, what I will do is to examine the notion of nondual 
consciousness in the context of the Buddhist aesthetics with the intent of showing 
how ethics and aesthetics coincide in this case. 
 
III. Zen Aesthetics   
 In his exposition of the Buddhist aesthetics, Yanagi (1972, p. 152)  states 
that "[t]he sense of beauty is born when the opposition between subject and 
object has been dissolved, when the subject called 'I' and the object called 'it' have 
both vanished into the realm of Non-dual Entirety," and that "[a] true awareness 
of beauty is to be found when beauty watches beauty, not when 'I' watches 'it'."  
Nishida makes the same point (1973, p. 101): "To view a thing aesthetically must 
mean to submerge the self within the thing in itself." 
When the self submerges within its object, when the "I" and the "it" both vanish 
into "Non-dual Entirety," what is achieved is subject-object unity.  But what 
exactly is this unity?  If, for instance, by subject-object unity we understand 
indistinguishability of the subject and object, so that a person, for instance, 
looking at a teapot, is unable to say which is the teapot and which is the human, 
such indistinguishability, even if possible as a pathology, is not what is aimed at 
in Zen.  A Zennist is not one who would mistake the teapot for a person.  But, 
she may easily say that she is "one with" the teapot and demonstrates it by 
picking it up and pouring tea from it.  Of course, others pour tea from a teapot, 
too, but they may not perceive that they are "one with" their teapots, and so, we 
ask, what is the crucial difference between the attainer and the non-attainer of 
nondual consciousness?   
 If we are looking for behavioral differences, we are bound to be 
disappointed.  Inasmuch as we think, and justifiably so, that how we perceive, 
think, and feel must make difference to how we behave, if we expect that we can 
tell nondual behaviour from dualistic behaviour just on the basis of the kinds of 
behaviour, I think we are mistaken.  For, duality or nonduality here concerns 
states of consciousness, and as such, they are matters of intentionality.  There is 
no one-to-one correspondence between behaviour and intention.  Two different 
people may exhibit the same behaviour but with very different understanding, 
motivation, and attitude.  Back to our example, one person could be pouring tea 
as an expression of experiencing seamless interconnectedness and harmony 
between the material world (as instantiated by the teapot and the tea inside) and 
humans, or between humans (as instantiated by the tea server and her guest).  
But another person could be pouring tea for the other with an outward show of 
cordiality but inward resentment.  When actions are the expressions of one's 
seamless interconnectedness and harmony with the world, they are nondual.  
Our actions are dualistic when they are expressions of a dualistic mind.  A 
dualistic person experiences the world as the Other, and therefore demarcates 
the self as categorically separate from the world. 
 But, at this point, my reader may point out to me that harmony and 
interconnectedness could not be exclusive to the nondual consciousness as I was 
making it out to be, and that ordinary folks, presumably in the realm of dualistic 
consciousness, also talk about, work with, and strive after harmony and 
interconnectedness.  So, if I want to insist on there being a real difference 
between the nondual sense of interconnectedness and the dualistic sense of it, 
then I must qualify the notion of interconnectedness and show that there is a 
significant difference.  Recalling Yanagi's description of nondual aesthetic 
perception, what is crucially captured there is dissolution of the subject-object 
dichotomy, not just as a theoretical possibility  but as experience--as an event in 
the consciousness.  The dissolution marks a definite and substantial change in 
the texture of consciousness, definitely noticeable to the experiencer. 
 Granted that it must be particularly difficult to describe and characterize 
nondual experience using a fundamentally dualistic language, still Yanagi and 
others converge on the characterization of the nonduality as the subject's not 
experiencing herself or himself to be categorically and substantially separate 
from all that surrounds one.   
 It is not so much that the boundary between the self and the other 
disappears as the boundary now appears as a site of the co-emergence of the two.  
Boundary does not separate; it joins the two sides inseparably like the two sides 
of a mobius strip.  This understanding of the self-other unity is a radical 
challenge to the usual view of the self-other dichotomy so that, if we accept the 
former, it spells the end of the latter.  In other words, embracing (not only 
theoretically but also experientially) the self-other co-emergence is 
simultaneously a deconstruction of the substantive notion and experience of the 
self, i.e., the self as an ego, categorically separate from the other.  When this ego-
self is dissolved, what would take its place is the sense of the self as a site of 
unbounded awareness.  It is unbounded because the previous demarcation 
between the self and the other transforms into their continuity as in the 
continuity of the inside and the outside in a mobius strip.  Self as a site of 
awareness is no more identified with one body than with another.  For example, 
watching a sunset, how can we truly separate the perceiver, the perceived, and 
the perception?  The perception is always already the co-emergence of the 
perceived and the perceiver (Macy 1991).  Self as a site of experience can no more 
be singularly located in one of these terms than in another.  Thus a Buddhist is 
more likely to understand the 'self' as a relational term, i.e., a term that signifies a 
relation rather than an entity. 
 All Buddhist practices, whether or not formally differentiated as moral, 
spiritual, or aesthetic, aim at the deconstruction of the singular entity-like sense 
of the self and the discovery and articulation of the relational sense.  As alluded 
to  before, this relational sense is not restricted to human relations but embraces 
all forms of relatedness that characterize our embeddedness in the sentient and 
material world.  Art is that which art-iculates life, as Panikkar (1992) so aptly 
puts it, and in this sense the Buddhist aesthetic practices are an articulation of the 
seamless interconnectedness of life, or as we say in Buddhism, the co-dependent 
arising (paticca samuppada), of the sentient world.  "To be one with" is a common 
expression used over and over again in the practice of any Zen-inspired arts, and 
it must be understood as an expression of the central effort in Buddhism to 
discover our fundamental interconnectedness with and embeddedness in the 
phenomenal world.  Thus in pursuing Calligraphy (shuuji), Water-colour 
Painting (mizue), Pottery (yakimono), Flower Arrangement (ikebana), Tea 
Ceremony (chanoyu), and even martial arts, the practitioner strives be "one with" 
the particular media and the subjects of his or her chosen art.   
 
 
IV. The Way of Tea (Chado) 
 Of the various Zen arts, I have chosen the Tea Ceremony as my case study 
in which to explore and illustrate the notion that the Zen ethics and aesthetics 
converge on the art of overcoming the dualistic ego-consciousness and 
discovering the continuity of the self with the non-self, thereby achieving 
harmony with the world.  The Tea Ceremony is a particularly appropriate 
example for us because it is a composite art that incorporates many other art 
forms, including the art of human interaction, and thus its reach of relatedness 
with the world through various media is all-embracing. 
 Drinking green tea is said to have its origin in Zen meditation practice.  
Green tea was served to the meditators in order to help them stay awake and 
alert during meditation.  But from this utilitarian beginning, it became an art of 
its own and highly revered as a path (tao) of  non-egoic consciousness.  
Hammitzsch states (1979, p. 63) that "[t]he Tea Way. . . is a Way designed to 
bring man to the annihilation of the ego, to pave the way for the ultimate 
experience of enlightenment."  To many of us, this claim about the art of tea may 
strike fantastical.  How could  the ordinary activity of drinking tea together bring 
about what appears to be the most transcendental result--that of overcoming the 
dualistic ego-consciousness.  Instead of tackling this question discursively, I will 
illustrate my answer with a narrative picture of the tea ceremony and a 
commentary thereupon.  Below I will briefly sketch out a typical Japanese Tea 
Ceremony.   
 On this blue-skied autumn day, bright with leaves turning red and gold, I traveled to 
Master Okada's tea garden.  A sanctuary within, the garden was enclosed by a white-washed 
wall partitioned by wooden beams and capped with blue-gray roof tiles.  Stepping inside the 
yellow cedar gate, I was greeted by a most exquisite yet natural-looking landscape of bamboo 
groves, Japanese maples, azalea bushes, and the ground thickly carpeted with varieties of 
moss.  Deep stillness and tranquillity, accentuated by the sound of a small waterfall 
somewhere, pervaded the landscape.  Following the garden path and crossing a little 
footbridge, I arrived at the waiting-lodge.  After exchanging greetings with other guests, I 
took up my seat beside them on the bamboo bench, and soon I was absorbed in the tranquil 
beauty of the garden.  Listening to the birds and waterfall, I felt as though I had been 
suddenly transported to another dimension of reality far away from the hectic pace of life 
and its many harrowing anxieties and discordance.  Breathing in deeply the peaceful 
atmosphere, I was beginning to feel a new sense of spaciousness settling in, loosening the 
usual tightness and preoccupiedness.    
 Soon the tea host appeared in the garden path, silently bowed to us, and walked away, 
signaling that he was ready to receive us.  The guests got up, bowed to each other, and one 
by one walked down the winding garden path.  A short way from the tea-house, we came to 
a large stone basin filled with trickling water from a bamboo pipe.  There we performed the 
symbolic purification ritual of rinsing the mouth and washing the hands.  Free of "worldly 
dust," we were ready to enter the tea-room.   
 The door to the tea-room was so low that I had to bend down, as if bowing, to enter.  It 
was said of the olden days of samurai that even powerful warriors had to take off their long 
swords and come down on their knees to enter the tea room.  The demeanor was a symbolic 
gesture of setting aside one's ego, here represented by the sword.  The room was bare except 
for the flower-arrangement in the alcove (tokonoma), but the design and the construction of 
the timber-clad ceiling, the fresh tatami floor, the walls with embedded wooden posts, 
showing  an exquisite grain, all spoke to me of a refined taste of austere simplicity and 
naturalness. 
 The Tea Ceremony began now, with our host bowing deeply to the guests.  He brought 
in various tea utensils and proceeded to make the fire in the fire-pit in the center of the floor 
to boil the tea-water in an iron-kettle.  His every movement was beautifully precise and 
composed like the decisively executed strokes of calligraphy.  The guests, likewise, followed 
the choreographed movements of holding the tea-bowl in the left palm, swilling it around 
after each sip, wiping the place on the rim from where one has drunk, and passing the tea 
bowl to the next guest with a deep bow.  Guests and host conversed convivially about 
matters of aesthetic appreciation and appraisal regarding tea utensils, teas, and tea practices.   
The last part of the ceremony was devoted to a detailed examination of the tea-bowl and the 
tea-caddy.   
 Now, having given a brief sketch of the Tea Ceremony, I shall proceed to 
discuss how the aesthetic experience of participating in the ceremony is a 
Buddhist practice of nonduality.  Hammitzsch, in relating to us the Tea Master 
Takuan Shuho's classic text on Tea, states that the whole nature of the Tea Way is 
outlined by four concepts: kei (reverence), wa (harmony); sei (purity), and jaku 
(tranquillity).  Hammitzsch then goes on to explain each of these concepts.  As 
for kei (reverence), he states (ibid., p. 69): "The concept 'reverence', kei, comprises 
deference, respect for each other and at the same time, self-control in so far as the 
ego is concerned."  In my understanding, what is implied here is a causal 
relationship between diminution of the ego and arising of reverence.  In other 
words, reverence results from shedding the egoic frame of mind which 
constantly assesses and calculates about the world in terms of its own gains and 
losses. The whole orchestration of participation that makes up the Tea 
Ceremony--from the contemplation on the landscape, the tea-room, and the tea-
utensils, to the repeated rounds of bowing, including bending down low to enter 
the tea-room, from meticulous observance of the most minute details of the 
ceremonial arrangement and sequences to the convivial conversations--is an 
exercise designed to draw the person out of the usual self-concerns and to enfold 
him or her into a heightened sense of relatedness and harmony with all that 
surrounds the person.  The tea garden is a microcosm into which the mountains, 
the rivers, the rocks, and the flowers are transported, and thus a nondual 
appreciation of the tea-garden is a prelude to the nondual perception of all of the 
natural world.  Even the boiling sound of water in the iron-kettle over the brazier 
is there to remind the listener of the wind singing in the pine.  Through reverent 
participation, the tea host and guests experience harmony among the myriad of 
sentient and insentient beings.  As Takuan Shuho so authoritatively pronounces 
it, "Chanoyu [tea ceremony] takes its origin from the spirit of harmonious union 
between heaven and earth, and thus becomes a vehicle of peace, a means of 
preserving order in the world" (quoted by Hammitzsch, pp 66-67). 
 This harmony is none other than the experience of nonduality where the 
self does not stand apart from, or as it often happens, in opposition to the Other, 
worrying about its self-preservation and self-gain, but instead experiences itself 
as being appropriately enfolded into the harmonious "inter-being," to use Thich 
Nhat Hanh's neologism.  In the context of inter-being--that is, seamless 
interconnectedness and co-emergency of all beings--the self is but a function and 
a site of receptivity and attunement, of adjusting thoughts and feelings, 
perceptions and actions to what lies before one.  Here is Hammitzsch once again 
(Ibid, p.69): "One's heart, once it has surrendered itself to [reverence and 
harmony] in the Zen sense, no longer has any room for any particular object or 
circumstance, but devotes itself solely to what is in front of it--in the sense of 
mushin [no-mind]--and thus becomes totally 'gentle and tender', nagoyaka."  This 
gentle and tender mushin --a psychic product of this highly aesthetic activity--is 
the source of nonviolence and compassion.   
 This connection between Zen aesthetics and the cultivation of compassion 
is further brought out in the third and fourth cardinal concepts of Chado, which 
are purity (sei) and tranquillity (jaku).  Purity signifies the mind-heart free and 
empty of those emotions caused by the turbulence of egoic desires, and 
tranquillity is the resultant state of the mind-heart.  The moral import of purity 
and tranquillity does not lie simply in the enjoyableness of these states.  If this 
were the case, it would indeed be difficult to see what their import is to morality.  
The moral import of purity and tranquillity is their ability to render the mind-
heart receptive and sensitive so that it can be more fully present to what lies 
before it.  Just as a turbulent water surface cannot register clear images, a mind-
heart full of egoic desires and concerns, even in the form of good will and 
sympathy, is not able to be attentive and sensitively attuned to reality around.  
Thus, the point of purity and tranquillity is not that one does not want to be 
disturbed by anything and wishes to stay pure and tranquil at all times, in which 
case, one should just avoid involvement in human affairs.  Rather, purity and 
tranquillity renders the mind-heart fit for the task of empathically perceiving and 
sharing the joys and sufferings of the world. 
 Communion--the dwelling in the space of nondual participation--is what 
Tea Ceremony is all about.  Rikyu, one of the most celebrated Tea Masters of the 
past, left behind a haiku whose last stanza simply expresses this communion 
between people: 
 
Garden path, tea-room! 
The guest and with him his host 
together at tea: 
their action is harmony 
and nothing stands between them. (Quoted by Hammitzsch, p. 61) 
A contemporary tea master, Master Sen, similarly speaks of the essence of chado: 
"What is the most wonderful thing for people like myself who follow the Way of 
Tea?  My answer: the oneness of host and guest created through 'meeting heart 
to heart' and sharing a bowl of tea." (Quoted by Carter, p. 122). 
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 The idea of art-making as a form of therapy is now commonly accepted.  
But art-making as a vehicle of moral education seems still novel with us.  Yet, my 
exploration of Zen aesthetics convinces me that we should explore such a 
possibility. Though the Tea Ceremony is a highly involved practice requiring a 
special setting and equipment, the essence behind this practice, namely the art of 
nondual participation, seems to be potentially present in all forms of art.  
Frederick Franck, author of Zen Seeing, Zen Drawing: Meditation in Action, and 
eminent teacher of drawing as an art of perception, unhesitatingly tells us that 
the capacity to draw is the same capacity "for empathy, wonder, and reverence, 
for awe for the simplest things of nature, for a leaf, a scallion" (1993, p. 14) and 
that "[t]o see is that specifically human capacity that opens one up to empathy, to 
compassion with all that lives and dies" (ibid. p. 39).  Franck contrasts "seeing" 
from "looking-at" and argues that what distinguishes the former from the latter is 
transformed consciousness wherein the subject-object dichotomy no longer 
holds.  Franck explains (ibid, xvii):  
 
The thing I draw, be it leaf, rosebush, woman, or child, is no longer a thing, no longer my 
"object" over and against which I am a supercilious "subject."  The split is healed.  When I am 
drawing leaf or caterpillar or human face, it is at once de-thingified. . . By drawing it, I 
dignify it, I declare it worthy of total attention, as worthy of attention as I am myself, for 
sheer existence is the awesome mystery and miracle we share. 
In another passage, Franck recounts his nondual meeting with a cow: (ibid., p. 
15). 
 
One day I was drawing a cow in a meadow near our house.  As I stood there drawing, our 
eyes met, and at that instant she stopped being "a cow."  She had become this singular fellow 
being whose warm breath mixed with my own in the cold fall air. 
To me, art-making as this practice of "deep seeing" that heals the subject-object 
duality goes straight to the heart of morality, since, as I understand it, the heart 
of morality is compassion and caring for our fellow beings, humans and non-
humans alike. 
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